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1 While much of the research and debate on assessing the consequences of  the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Dominican Republic-Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is concentrated on levels of foreign direct investment (FDI),
trade deficits and diversion, changes in factor markets, and gross domestic product (GDP)
growth, the effects of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR on the macroeconomic synchronization and
policy coordination of member countries is still contested and less systemically known.
Although  NAFTA  and  the  CAFTA-DR  each  established  a  free  trade  area  (FTA)  that
eliminated  trade  barriers  for  member  countries,  they  had  no  explicit  terms  on  the
management  of  macroeconomic  policies  for  member  states.  However,  with increased
economic integration resulting from these free trade agreements,  the macroeconomic
cycles  of  member  countries  may  become  more  closely  synchronized.  Symmetry  in
business cycles is  important first  because it  is  critical  in determining the utility and
efficacy  of  macroeconomic  policy  coordination.  Specifically,  high  business  cycle
synchronization between partner countries indicates that policy coordination would be
beneficial for member countries, and asymmetry would imply the need for independent
fiscal and monetary policies1
2 Second, macroeconomic synchronization is important for developing country partners in
a FTA, because synchronous effects with high-income partners may increase the financial
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stability of developing member states by reducing their macroeconomic volatility. While
there is prior scholarship on macroeconomic synchronization and policy coordination,
much of it focuses on the European Union2, which largely consists of a group of deeply
integrated high-income industrial states, the work on NAFTA tends to focus on only one
of  the  important  relationships  described  here,  and  similar  research  on  CAFTA-DR is
limited due its more recent implementation. To clarify these two key relationships under
NAFTA and CAFTA-DR,  I  examine the degree  of  macroeconomic  synchronization and
policy coordination between NAFTA countries and between CAFTA-DR states and discuss
the  economic  and  political  implications  of  current  levels  of  macroeconomic
synchronization and policy coordination for partner countries. 
3 Section  1  begins  with  a  presentation  of  the  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on
macroeconomic  synchronization  and  economic  integration  and  then  considers
macroeconomic synchronization after NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. I find some indication of
increasing synchronization between partner countries post-NAFTA. There is also some
preliminary  evidence  that  CAFTA-DR  economies  also  show  some  convergence  post-
CAFTA-DR.  Then  in  Section  2,  I  look  at  the  relationship  between  macroeconomic
synchronization and volatility between NAFTA states and between CAFTA-DR countries.
Overall,  macroeconomic  volatility  has  decreased for  NAFTA and CAFTA-DR members.
Specifically, Canada is less susceptible to spillover effects from the United States (US) and
Mexico. In contrast, the Mexican economy is much more susceptible to spillover effects
from the US, which increases financial instability. CAFTA-DR states also face negative
spillover effects due to slowdowns in US growth. This indicates that synchronization is
not always beneficial and can be costly in an economic downturn. Finally in Section 3, I
present the theoretical conditions under which policy coordination is desirable and then
analyze levels of policy coordination after NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. I find that there is not
much policy coordination in the post-NAFTA and post-CAFTA-DR. 
 
1. Macroeconomic Synchronization after Economic
Integration
4 The literature on business cycles and trade has established a link between trade intensity
and  business  cycle  synchronization.  Frankel  and  Rose  discovered  this  regularity  by
looking at 20 industrialized economies and found that countries that trade more also
have higher business cycle symmetry (Frankel,  Rose 1998 :  1009–1025). This finding is
supported by later  studies  of  European state (Fidrmuc 2004:  1–12)  and by work that
includes a cross-national sample of both industrial and developing countries(Calderon,
Chong,  Stein  2007).  However,  this  relationship  is:  (1)  stronger  between  industrial
countries, weaker in industrial-developing pairs, and weakest in developing country pairs
(Ibid.)  and  (2)  weaker  between  states  with  more  inter-industry  trade  and  thus,
asymmetries  in production structures3 and stronger between states  with more intra-
industry trade and therefore, similarities in production structures (Imbs 2004: 723–734;
Calderon, Chong, Stein, op. cit.). These mixed results means that while trade intensity
increases with a FTA, synchronization does not automatically result between all member
states. 
5 Rather, business cycle convergence also depends on the degree of economic specialization
and financial integration between member countries as well as labor market integration
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(Inklaar, Jong-A-Pin, de Haan 2005). In fact, synchronization could decrease if a free trade
agreement  encourages  specialization  between countries  (Lederman,  Maloney,  Servén,
2005:  81).  Conversely,  as  financial  shocks  more  easily  cross  borders  with  financial
integration, financial integration could also likely lead to an increase in macroeconomic
synchronization, as capital mobility makes domestic interest rates and financial asset
prices more sensitive to international conditions (Ibid.:82). Then considering labor, work
on  OECD  countries  found  that  labor  market  heterogeneity  reduces  business  cycle
synchronization (Fonseca, Patureau, Sopraseuth, 2010: 867). While free trade agreements
typically do not liberalize labor markets, trade integration can indirectly lead to more
labor market integration through competition in the production market (Martinoia 2009:
5). As a result, “when capital mobility is combined with trade liberalization, and when
production  becomes  more  integrated  across  national  borders,  the  employment  and
earnings  prospects  for  workers  in  different  countries  become  increasingly
interdependent,” (Blecker 2003: 6) which can also contribute to some synchronization. 
6 Taken together, we should expect regional integration to contribute to business cycle
synchronization between industrial  high-income partners in a FTA. Considering trade
integration first, industrial high-income partners will tend to have similar production
structures with higher levels of intra-industry trade (IIT) (Grubel, Lloyd 1975; Caves 1981:
203-223), including both vertical and also horizontal intra-industry trade, in which traded
products are of similar quality but have different attributes (Krugman 1981 : 959–973).
High levels of IIT indicate product integration between markets and so may also point to
some labor market  integration.  In terms of  financial  integration,  which occurs when
financial assets face a single set of rules and the equalization of returns on those financial
assets, high-income industrial countries are more financially integrated than developing
countries  as  determined by  capital  restriction  and openness  measures  (International
Monetary Fund 2001: 146-152). This indicates that high-income industrial pairs may be
more financially integrated than industrial-developing and developing pairs. Preferential
trade agreements can also directly affect levels of FDI, with the inclusion of provisions for
investment liberalization as well as indirectly affect FDI through trade liberalization. So
FDI flows can be used to show financial integration. In general, regional integration has a
positive effect on FDI (Kreinin, Plummer 2008: 497–454). This is because the factors that
are influenced by trade liberalization, GDP growth and market size significantly affect the
flow of FDI (Worth 1998: 82). Thus, states with higher growth and larger market sizes will
likely have more FDI and the extent to which a trade agreement affects those factors will
determine how much a FTA affects FDI (Ibid). Specifically, Feils and Rahman’s study of
NAFTA found that NAFTA has had a significant positive effect on FDI flows for the United
States and Canada but not Mexico (Feils, Rahman 2008: 147-163). So this FDI approach also
supports  the  implication  that  high-income  industrial  pairs  are  more  financially
integrated. 
7 For industrial-developing partners,  we should expect some but not as much business
cycle convergence in comparison to industrial high-income pairs. Industrial-developing
pairs do participate in vertical IIT. This vertical trade results from production sharing
and  so  it  may  also  indicate  some  labor  market  integration.  In  addition,  since
specialization in vertical trade occurs mainly within an industry, specialization does not
necessarily lead to asymmetric production structures and industry specific shocks. As a
result,  vertical  IIT  can  lead  to  increased  macroeconomic  synchronization.  However,
economic  integration  between  industrial  nations  and  developing  countries  is  widely
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believed to generate more inter-industry trade than IIT (Clark, 2007 :  493). Therefore,
industrial-developing partners will tend to have more asymmetric production structures
than  industrial  high-income  pairs.  Regarding  financial integration,  the  pace  of
investment liberalization for  developing countries  is  slower than industrial  countries
based on capital restriction and openness measures (International Monetary Fund op.
cit).  This  indicates that  industrial-developing pairs  may be less  financially integrated
than  high-income  industrial  pairs.  In  addition,  while regional  integration  does  have
positive effect on FDI (Kreinin, Plummer op. cit.), taking from the NAFTA experience, this
effect may not be very strong for developing countries (Feils, Rahman op. cit.). However,
several empirical studies have found evidence of co-integrated Mexican, Canadian, and
US equity markets after the implementation of NAFTA (Gilmore, McManus 2004: 137-150;
Aggarwal, Kyaw, 2005: 393-406; Chukwuogor-Ndu and Kasibhatla 2007: 37–53). Thus, there
is evidence of financial integration in a FTA with asymmetrical partners but this effect is
weaker for the developing state. 
8 Finally, developing pairs in a FTA should be the least synchronized. Even though IIT exists
among developing countries, the amount of IIT decreases as GNP per capita drops for any
state, and also decreases along with greater differences in GNP per capita between states
(Havrylyshyn, Civan 1985). This also means that labor market integration is less likely.
Additionally,  as  economic  integration  creates  more  inter-industry  trade  between
industrial  nations  and  developing  countries,  developing  pairs  will  each  be  more
specialized since their individual production and trade will likely be focused on the larger
markets of high-income industrial partners rather than another developing state in the
FTA. So developing country partners will also have the most asymmetrical production
structures in comparison to industrial pairs and industrial-developing partners. Since the
level of investment liberalization is lower for developing states, we should also expect
financial integration between developing states to be weak although there may be an
overall effect of financial integration if trade and capital flows of both states are oriented
toward a high-income industrial partner. 
9 However, it must be noted that even though scholars have found a positive link between
trade and macroeconomic synchronization, it is difficult to exactly quantify a FTA’s effect
on macroeconomic synchronization. This is because we do not know precisely how much
trade policy would be liberalized without a FTA, given already increasing trade in the
time periods considered here. Similarly, we do not know specifically how much volatility
would be moderated and how much synchronicity would grow without  a  FTA,  given
existing  economic  trends  of  tempering  economic  volatility  and  increasing
macroeconomic synchronicity in the time periods examined in this study.
10 Moreover,  concluding  a  simple  direct  causation  between  a  FTA  and  macroeconomic
synchronization is not possible in view of other known determinants of macroeconomic
synchronization. These other determinants scholars have found and explored are: trade
intensity, trade specialization, economic specialization, policy coordination, and financial
integration (Böwer, Guillemineau 2006). While some scholars contest the magnitude of
these effects,  the literature reviewed in this section has shown the effect of regional
integration on trade intensity, trade specialization, economic specialization, and financial
integration. 
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1.1 Macroeconomic Synchronization after NAFTA
11 NAFTA was implemented in January 1994 by Mexico, a developing state; Canada, high-
income  state;  and  the  United  States,  another  high-income  state4.  Since  the
implementation  of  NAFTA,  trade  flows  have  generally  increased  between  partner
countries  (Kose,  Rebucci  2005:  79;  Kose,  Meredith,  Towe  2004:  13-14).  Scholars  have
largely agreed that NAFTA has had an effect on trade intensity although they do differ on
the significance of this phenomenon (Congressional Budget Office 2003). This is because
trade was also influenced by Mexico’s unilateral liberalization after joining the General
Agreement on Tariffs and trade in 1986, US economic expansion in the 1990s, and the
Mexican Peso devaluation in 1995 (Villarreal 2003). 
12 Considering types of trade,  the following survey of empirical  research on trade finds
support for prior work described in Section 1 in which high-income industrial pairs in a
FTA take  part  in  more  IIT  than  industrial-developing  and  developing  partners,  who
participate in more inter-industry trade. Between 1993-2007 for the US-Mexico pair, the
average Grubel-Lloyd (GL) index values, which measures IIT, were largely static and the
trade  weighted  GL  index  values  decreased  over  time (Clark  2010:  3).  Furthermore,
measurements of IIT indexes and marginal IIT indexes confirm that post-NAFTA trade
between the U.S. and Mexico has remained mostly inter-industry and trade growth has
been predominately due to inter-industry trade (Shelburne 2001:  215-234).  Examining
Mexico’s inter-industry trade share, it increased from 59.7% in 1993 to 61.9% in 2007
(Ekanayake, Veeramacheneni Moslares, 2009: 34). In comparison, trade between Canada
and  the  United  States  is  significantly  intra-industry  in  nature  as  calculated  in  2000
(Fontagné,  Freudenberg,  Gaulier 2005:  22),  and this IIT has increased as measured by
marginal IIT indexes from 1980-1998 (Bru◌̈lhart, Thorpe 2001). Looking at inter-industry
trade share, it decreased from 52.6% in 1993 to 50.2% in 2007 for Canada (Ekanayake,
Veeramacheneni, Moslares op. cit.). Similarly, the trade after NAFTA in just agricultural
products between Canada and Mexico and the US and Mexico has been found to be largely
inter-industry trade while the US-Canada pair  is  largely characterized by IIT (Qasmi,
Fausti 2001: 255-271).
13 Considering financial integration and the terms of NAFTA, investors from within NAFTA
are  generally  guaranteed  equal  treatment  with  domestic  investors  for  most
manufacturing sectors and a few service sectors, as well as transparent regulations (Feils,
Rahman, op. cit.:148). In general, FDI flows between NAFTA partners have also expanded
after the agreement (Kose, Meredith, Towe, op. cit.: 16-17). There has also been increasing
co-integration of Mexican, Canadian, and US equity markets after the implementation of
NAFTA  (Gilmore,  McManus  op.  cit.:  137-150;  Aggarwal,  Kyaw  op.  cit.:  393-406;
Chukwuogor-Ndu, Kasibhatla op. cit.:  37–53). However, as mentioned earlier, Feils and
Rahman’s more recent work on NAFTA found that NAFTA has had a substantial positive
effect on FDI flows for the United States and Canada but not on Mexico (Feils, Rahman,
op. cit.: 147-163). These patterns indicate that while there has been some overall financial
integration in the three NAFTA states, the effect has been weaker for Mexico. 
14 Turning to labor, while NAFTA did not formally address labor market issues5, shifts in
trade and production can still affect labor market integration. However, studies on the
impact of NAFTA on aggregate employment have found little or no significant effect on
NAFTA  members  (Burfisher,  Robinson,  Thierfelder  2001:  130).  Using  wage  criteria,
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Robertson also  discovers  little  evidence  of  a  significant  effect  from NAFTA on labor
market  integration between the US and Mexico (Robertson 2005:  425-448).  So as  the
theoretical and empirical literature has indicated, we should expect higher business cycle
convergence between Canada and the US6 and lower business cycle convergence between
Mexico and the US and Mexico and Canada.
15 Previous research in international business cycle synchronization has typically relied on
two measures of macroeconomic synchronization: (1) various measures of correlations of
bilateral  output  over  time and (2)  the  proportion of  output  variation that  is  due to
common factors (International Monetary Fund 2007: 121-160). I use output correlation
coefficients since I am interested in looking at the contemporaneous synchronization in
annual output variables between two states7. 
16 Table 1 below presents Pearson correlation coefficients of output from World Bank data
using annual data (World Bank, 2011). I used three measures of output: the natural log of
exports of goods and services, the natural log of value added industrial output, and gross
domestic product (GDP) growth as an annual percent. Furthermore to detrend the data, it
was first differenced. To help look at the potential impact of an FTA, I separated the data
into equal time periods before and after the implementation of NAFTA, in this case 15
years and for the entire period between 1978-2009. 
 
Table 1
Output Correlation Coefficients
 
Natural Log of Exports of Goods
and Services (constant 2000 US
$)
Natural Log of Value Added
Industry  (constant  2000  US
$)
GDP  Growth
(annual %)
US-Mexico
1978-1993
-0.188 0.958*** 0.247
US-Mexico
1994-2009
0.810*** 0.549** 0.767***
US-Mexico
1978-2009
0.408** 0.941*** 0.395**
Canada-Mexico
1978-1993
-0.234 0.962*** 0.436
Canada-Mexico
1994-2009
0.884*** 0.613** 0.509*
Canada-Mexico
1978-2009
0.528*** 0.948*** 0.445**
US-Canada
1978-1993
0.270 0.996*** 0.861***
US-Canada
1994-2009
0.677*** 0.874*** 0.815***
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US-Canada
1978-2009
0.541*** 0.991*** 0.845***
Significance levels: *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
17 For  exports,  the  correlation  coefficients  indicate  greater  synchronization  between
member states after NAFTA with the greatest shift between high-income partners and
Mexico. Considering GDP growth,  there seems to be increased co-movement between
Mexico and the US and not much change between the other member states. Looking at
value  added  industrial  output,  both  high-income  pairs  and  Mexico  have  a  lower
correlation coefficient after NAFTA. This is an indication that industrial structures are
changing between the high-income partners and Mexico during this time period. It must
be noted that changes in industrial structure of developed economies, particularly in the
US  began  in  the  1960’s  with  the  shift  away  from manufacturing  and  agriculture  to
services (Fuchs 1968). However, research on the impact of NAFTA on key labor-intensive
industries, namely the automotive, electronics, and textiles and apparel industries, has
found increased production sharing through the expansion of the maquiladora industry
in the post-NAFTA period for  the US and Mexico8.  Overall,  following theoretical  and
empirical predictions, between the US and Canada, there are generally higher levels of
output correlations. The correlation coefficients are overall less strong in the Mexican
case, just as one would expect.
18 In terms of sector output correlations, which point toward asymmetrical or symmetrical
production structures between states, Table 2 below illustrates bilateral sector Pearson’s
r  for  the  natural  log  of  value  added  agriculture,  the  natural  log  of  value  added
manufacturing, and the natural log of value added services sectors from annual World
Bank data (World Bank op. cit.).  Value added data in each sector was used as a more
accurate measure of sector output than gross figures. Then to detrend the data, it was
first differenced.  I  separated the results into equal time periods before and after the
implementation  of  NAFTA,  in  this  case  11  years  and  for  the  entire  period  between
1982-2005.
 
Table 2
Sector Correlation Coefficients
 
Natural  Log  of  Value
Added  Agriculture
(constant 2000 US $)
Natural  Log  of  Value
Added  Manufacturing
(current US $)
Natural  Log  of  Value
Added  Services
(constant 2000 US $)
US-Mexico
1982-1993
0.287 0.440 -0.128
US-Mexico
1994-2005
0.036 -0.097 0.770***
US-Mexico
1982-2005
0.204 0.208 0.216
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Canada-
Mexico
1982-1993
0.050 0.050 -0.165
Canada-
Mexico
1994-2005
0.235 0.235 0.409
Canada-
Mexico
1982-2005
0.204 0.119 0.128
US-Canada
1982-1993
-0.004 0.809*** 0.717***
US-Canada
1994-2005
0.418 0.645** 0.436
US-Canada
1982-2005
0.204 0.696*** 0.635***
Significance levels: *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
19 In the agricultural industry, there are lower correlations in the NAFTA period between
the Mexico-US pair and the Canada-Mexico pair and higher between the US-Canada pair
but all the correlations are weak in this sector, signifying low symmetry. Although on the
whole agricultural trade between NAFTA members has grown in the post-NAFTA period,
this expansion has not been uniform. For example, US agricultural exports to Mexico
doubled from 1993-2003 and Canada became the largest importer of US agricultural goods
while value added by Mexican agriculture dropped from $32 billion in 1993 to $25 billion
in 2003 (Hufbauer, Schott, 2005: 287-289). Considering the manufacturing and the service
sectors,  there are high correlations for  the US-Canada pair  but  they decreased post-
NAFTA. This may generally indicate more symmetrical production structures but also
some adjustments in the post-NAFTA period. For the US-Mexico pair and the Canada-
Mexico pair in manufacturing and the service sectors, the correlations are largely weak.
As  we  expect  from  the  literature,  overall  weak  correlations  for  the  US-Mexico  and
Canada-Mexico pairs suggest asymmetrical production structures and generally higher
correlations indicate more symmetrical production structures for the US and Canada. 
20 In  the  post-NAFTA  period,  there  are  signs  that  macroeconomic  synchronization  is
increasing  between  partner  countries.  However,  by  looking  at  output  and  sector
correlations, this synchronization is greater between the US and Canada in comparison to
the US and Mexico and Canada and Mexico. These results support prior research that has
found increasing co-movement between the NAFTA partners. For instance, Torres and
Vela have found that the Mexican business cycle has synchronized with the United States
following  regional  integration  (Torres,  Vela  2003:  319-342).  In  addition,  Cuevas,
Messmacher, and Werner discover the synchronization of Mexican macroeconomic cycles
with Canadian and American cycles and the increase in co-movement between Mexican
and American sectoral business cycles (Cuevas, Messmacher, Werner 2003). Finally, Kose,
Meredith, and Towe find there has been an increase in business cycle synchronization
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between Mexico and the United States and Canada using the common factor approach
(Kose, Meredith, Towe op. cit,: 20-21). 
 
1.2 Macroeconomic Synchronization after CAFTA-DR
21 Developing partner states of  CAFTA-DR currently are the Dominican Republic (March
2007),  Costa  Rica  (January  2009),  El  Salvador  (March  2006),  Guatemala  (July  2006),
Nicaragua  (April  2006),  and Honduras  (April  2006)9.  The  US  is  the  only  high-income
partner and began its participation in March 2006 with El Salvador. As a group in 2004,
CAFTA-DR states were the 12th largest market for US exports and the 15th largest supplier
of imports (Clark op. cit.:505). However, the individual CAFTA-DR states are relatively
small economies to the United States and the extent of trade linkages differ among the
various CAFTA-DR states. The Dominican Republic, which has the largest trade share with
the US among the CAFTA-DR states, found its exports to the US largely stagnate after the
CAFTA-DR agreement but generally increase with other CAFTA-DR members, although
one must take into account the global economic crisis that unfolded in late 2008 (Molina,
Bussolo,  Iacovone  2010).  Overall,  the  United  States  has  increased  its  exports  to  the
CAFTA-DR states since CAFTA-DR by 14.4% in 2006 (Hornbeck 2008a:  6),  16% in 2007
(Hornbeck 2008b: 7), and 12.45% in 2008 (Hornbeck 2009: 8) but not surprisingly down
21.3% in 2009 (Hornbeck 2010:  9).  But taking from Mexico’s NAFTA experience,  trade
intensity  between the  CAFTA-DR states  should  increase  over  time  in  the  long  term,
although trade volumes between individual CAFTA-DR states are much lower than for
NAFTA countries (Kose, Rebucci op. cit.: 83). Thus in comparison to NAFTA states, the
post-CAFTA shift  may be more modest.  Moving on to the composition of  trade after
CAFTA-DR, studies have found that although the US is the largest trading partner for
CAFTA-DR countries by far, IIT as measured by GL indexes are very low between the US
and CAFTA-DR states in the pre-CAFTA-DR period from 1992-2004 (Clark op. cit.: 493-496).
So production structures are already more asymmetrical between the US and CAFTA-DR
states even before CAFTA-DR implementation. Looking to the record of the post-NAFTA
period, we should expect increasing inter-industry trade and some growth in vertical IIT
between  industrial-developing  pairs  in  the  post-CAFTA  period.  Again  following  the
NAFTA  experience,  we  should  not  anticipate  much  labor  market  integration  under
CAFTA-DR.  Finally,  regarding  financial  linkages  between CAFTA-DR states,  they  were
already  increasing  in  the  mid-1990s  before  the  CAFTA-DR agreement  because  of  the
increase in foreign ownership of banks, high dollarization, and the rise of capital flows
(Swiston,  2010:  8-9).  As  a  result,  we should see  stronger  financial  integration in  the
CAFTA-DR period. So in terms of macroeconomic synchronization, we should expect some
but  not  much convergence  between the  US and the  developing  states  of  CAFTA-DR,
especially in the short-term. 
22 For  data  purposes,  I  chose  El  Salvador,  Guatemala,  and  Honduras  to  represent  the
developing states, since they have been members since 2006, other CAFTA-DR members
joined more recently, and the available annual World Bank data (World Bank op. cit.)
would not be sufficient for any kind of analysis10. Since the data covers just four years
after CAFTA-DR, the analysis only reflects short-term adjustments and fluctuations and
no  long-term  inference  can  be  made.  Correlation  coefficients  given  in  Table  3  are
Pearson's r11.
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Table 3
Output Correlation Coefficients
 
Natural  Log  of  Exports  of
Goods and Services  (constant
2000 US$)
Natural  Log  of  Value
Added  Industry  (constant
2000 US$)
GDP  Growth
(annual %)
US-El  Salvador
2002-2005
-0.313 -0.833 -0.881
US-El  Salvador
2006-2009
0.892 0.857 0.972
US-El  Salvador
2002-2009
0.709 0.470 0.726
US-Guatemala
2002-2005
0.499 -0.260 0.152
US-Guatemala
2006-2009
0.896 0.991*** 0.950**
US-Guatemala
2002-2009
0.784 0.696 0.966***
US-Honduras
2002-2005
0.129 -0.474 0.968**
US-Honduras
2006-2009
0.971** 0.952** 0.966**
US-Honduras
2002-2009
0.608 0.739* 0.932***
Guatemala-El
Salvador 2002-2005
0.650 0.481 0.208
Guatemala-El
Salvador 2006-2009
0.613 0.882 0.849
Guatemala-El
Salvador 2002-2009
0.474 0.774 0.779
Honduras-El
Salvador 2002-2005
0.857 -0.092 -0.875
Honduras-El
Salvador 2006-2009
0.913* 0.934* 0.999***
Honduras-El
Salvador 2002-2009
0.864** 0.740* 0.901***
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Honduras-
Guatemala
2002-2005
0.919* -0.275 0.279
Honduras-
Guatemala
2006-2009
0.791 0.933* 0.838
Honduras-
Guatemala
2002-2009
0.546 0.787* 0.738*
Significance levels: *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
23 Considering  exports,  correlations  are  generally  increasing  in  the  post-CAFTA  period
between  all  states  but  only  the  US-Honduras  and  Honduras-El  Salvador  pairs  were
significant.  After  CAFTA-DR,  there  are  generally  higher  correlations  in  industrial
production and GDP growth with significant results for US-Honduras, US-Guatemala, and
Honduras-El Salvador pairs. The significant correlation coefficients suggest increased co-
movement as expected between the US and Guatemala and the US and Honduras but also
between Honduras  and El  Salvador  and Honduras  and Guatemala  in  the  post-CAFTA
period. The latter is an interesting result and indicates some economic synchronization
and integration between the developing states in the FTA in the post-CAFTA period. This
result  falls  in  line  with Molina,  Bussolo,  and Iacovone’s  findings  that  the Dominican
Republic’s exports to the US and other developing CAFTA-DR members have expanded
since 2005,  accelerated in 2007 before decreasing in 2009 (Molina,  Iacovone,  op.  cit.).
However,  it  must  be noted that  research on Central  America synchronization before
CAFTA-DR  reported  a  small  positive  relationship  between  trade  intensity  and
synchronization for CAFTA-DR states (Fiess 2007: 49–72). Synchronization was also found
to be generally low compared to NAFTA but with the greatest co-movement between
Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras and between CAFTA-DR states and the
US (World Bank Central  America Department,  2005:  162-5).  Then,  controlling for  the
common impact of the U.S. business cycle, only Costa Rica and Guatemala, Costa Rica and
El Salvador and Guatemala and Honduras are affected by common factors (Ibid.). These
countries  also account for  the largest  share of  intra-regional  trade before CAFTA-DR
(Ibid.). As a result, along with the short time period under consideration, the significant
high correlations found in Table 3 can only suggest  some preliminary indications of
increasing business cycle convergence between developing CAFTA-DR states and between
the US and CAFTA-DR states in the post-CAFTA period.
24 To consider  the  symmetry  of  production  structures  for  CAFTA-DR members,  I  again
calculated sector output correlation coefficients. Table 4 below shows the Pearson’s r for
the natural log of value added agriculture, the natural log of value added manufacturing,
and the natural log of value added services sectors from annual World Bank data (World
Bank op. cit.). Also to detrend the data, it was first differenced. I separated the results
into equal time periods before and after the implementation of CAFTA, in this case 4 years
and for the entire period between 2002-2009. 
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Table 4
Sector Correlation Coefficients
 
Natural  Log  of  Value
Added  Agriculture
(constant 2000 US$)
Natural  Log  of  Value
Added  Manufacturing
(current US$)
Natural  Log  of  Value
Added  Services
(constant 2000 US $)
US-El  Salvador
2002-2005
0.502 0.085 0.969**
US-El  Salvador
2006-2009
-0.384 0.696 0.822
US-El  Salvador
2002-2009
-0.246 0.485 0.675
US-Guatemala
2002-2005
-0.988** 0.971** 0.208
US-Guatemala
2006-2009
-0.751 0.669 0.930*
US-Guatemala
2002-2009
-0.621 0.725 0.249
US-Honduras
2002-2005
-0.647 0.375 0.901*
US-Honduras
2006-2009
-0.836 0.759 0.837
US-Honduras
2002-2009
-0.701 0.584 0.771*
Guatemala-El
Salvador
2002-2005
-0.584 0.037 0.073
Guatemala-El
Salvador
2006-2009
0.136 0.939* 0.943*
Guatemala-El
Salvador
2002-2009
-0.134 0.827** 0.740*
Honduras-El
Salvador
2002-2005
-0.561 -0.016 0.979**
Macroeconomic Synchronization and Policy Coordination After Regional Economic...
IdeAs, 1 | Automne 2011
12
Honduras-El
Salvador
2006-2009
0.734 0.720 0.707
Honduras-El
Salvador
2002-2009
0.314 0.696 0.665
Honduras-
Guatemala
2002-2005
0.749 0.585 0.029
Honduras-
Guatemala
2006-2009
0.351 0.888 0.893
Honduras-
Guatemala
2002-2009
0.467 0.828** 0.525
Significance levels: *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
25 In the agricultural sector, we see lower correlations in the CAFTA-DR period between
high income-developing CAFTA-DR partners and higher correlations between developing
CAFTA-DR members but most all of the correlation coefficients are not significant. While
in the manufacturing sector, there are increasing correlations after the CAFTA-DR period
for all pairs except for the US and Guatemala but again few results are significant. Lastly,
there  are  no  generalizable  patterns  in  the  service  sector,  with  a  majority  of  the
coefficients  not  being  significant.  As  we  expect  from  the  literature,  overall  weak
correlations for most pairs in all sectors suggest asymmetrical production structures for
all CAFTA-DR members. Indeed, prior research has found little evidence of IIT between
developing CAFTA-DR members and the US, except for Coast Rica even before CAFTA-DR
(Fiess op. cit.: 65). However, these post-CAFTA-DR sector correlations again only look at a
very short-term period and must be expanded upon as more data become available.
26 After CAFTA-DR,  there  is  some  preliminary  evidence  based  on  output  correlation
coefficients to suggest greater macroeconomic synchronization of CAFTA-DR states in the
post-CAFTA-DR period.  However,  these coefficients only consider the very short-term
after CAFTA-DR so they likely overestimate co-movement, especially since tariffs for non-
agricultural products were already low prior to the implementation of CAFTA-DR and
reductions in tariffs for agricultural products are gradual (Morley,  2005).  In addition,
asymmetrical production structures along with the lower level of income, smaller size,
and less diversified production of developing members may weaken prospects for closer
integration and synchronization between states.
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2. Macroeconomic Synchronization, Volatility and
Stability 
27 Macroeconomic volatility has been found to have a generally negative impact on GDP and
output growth and it can have a negative effect on consumption growth, particularly in
developing countries with limited access to international  financial  markets and weak
domestic financial  markets (Ramey, Ramey: 1138-51;  Kose,  Prasad, Terrones,  2003).  In
terms  of  output,  macroeconomic  volatility  affects  the  level  of  uncertainty,  which
discourages investment and subsequently lowers output (Pindyck, 1991: 1110-1148). But
for  OECD  countries,  business  cycle  fluctuations  have  decreased  since  the  mid-1980s
(Dalsgaard,  Elmeskov,  Park  2002).  According  to  Basu  and  Taylor,  these  changes  in
business  cycle  characteristics  appear  to  be  associated  with  changes  over  time  in
characteristics of the monetary system, particularly capital mobility or controls and fixed
or floating exchange rate (Basu, Taylor 1999:  45-68).  While there has been increasing
capital  mobility  in  international  financial  markets  since  the  1970s,  as  a  result  of
deregulation  and  decreasing  capital  controls  on  foreign  exchange,  scholars  have
criticized  the  international  financial  institutions  for  pushing  capital  mobility  on
developing  economies  in  the  1990s  (Stiglitz  2003).  Stiglitz  in  particular  has  largely
attributed the currency crises in emerging market to the lack of capital controls for those
states (Ibid.). To deal with macroeconomic volatility, consumption can be smoothed by
borrowing,  which  is  made  possible  with  capital  mobility.  However,  often  developing
countries are unable to do so due to the limited access to international financial markets,
weak domestic financial markets, and poor regulation. So developing states are unable to
benefit  from capital  mobility.  Instead,  large and sudden changes in capital  flows will
create macroeconomic volatility and even a currency crisis. 
28 Consequently, it is no surprise that macroeconomic volatility occurs more frequently in
developing  countries  than  in  high-income  states  (Loayza,  Rancière,  Servén,  Ventura
2007). Developing and small sized countries with open economies can be more vulnerable
to domestic and external shocks because they are unable to mitigate the effects of these
kinds of economic disturbances12.  This is due to four factors: 1) developing states are
incapable of making fiscal policy adjustments to diversify risk; 2) they may not be able to
shift  sectors  when  economic  conditions  shift;  3) they  have  weak  domestic  financial
markets;  4)  they  have  fragile  international  financial  links  that  restrict  international
borrowing (Callebero 2000: 31-88). Similarly, small economies, which are a characteristic
of most CAFTA-DR members, have high trade shares and concentrated export structures
that make them vulnerable to external shocks, which can further worsen macroeconomic
volatility  (Easterly,  Kray  2000:  2013-2027).  As  a  result,  in  these  kinds  of  states,
macroeconomic volatility can help precipitate financial crises, output loss, and reduced
economic growth. 
29 However,  trade  integration  and  greater  macroeconomic  synchronization  with  high-
income industrial states may help reduce the cyclical fluctuations of developing member
states in FTAs. This can result when increased trade leads to higher IIT in specialization
and a  larger  volume of  intermediate  inputs  trade,  which can lower output  volatility
(Razin, Rose 1992: 48-76). Trade liberalization and higher business cycle symmetry also
can  secure  market  access,  create  a  more  stable  investment  climate,  increase  export
diversification  and  reduce  terms  of  trade  risk  from  external  terms  of  trade  shocks
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(Lederman,  Maloney,  Servén  op.  cit.:  98-102);  therefore,  also  decreasing  the  level  of
cyclical fluctuations and increasing macroeconomic stability for developing states. For
example, research on NAFTA and the Peso Crisis suggests that instead of producing the
crisis,  NAFTA assisted in the swift  conclusion of  the crisis  and helped make possible
Mexico’s increasing growth in the late 1990s, since NAFTA committed Mexico to open
markets and prevented tariff increases (Burfisher, Robinson, Thierfelder, op. cit.: 133).
NAFTA also gave Mexico guaranteed access to the U.S. market though the currency crisis,
despite the growing competitiveness of Mexico’s exports and the decreasing demand for
imports (Ibid.). Finally, the formal obligations of both countries to NAFTA signaled their
commitment and restored the confidence of investors about the future expectations for
the economic recovery and growth of the Mexico (Ibid.). 
30 In  contrast,  empirical  research  has  also  shown  that  developing  states  have  more
sensitivity to the economic developments and conditions of high-income partners in a
FTA  (International  Monetary  Fund,  op.  cit.:121-160).  Trade  integration  can  lead  to
increased output and consumption volatility when increased trade leads to higher inter-
industry specialization in states and so these states are more likely to be sensitive to
industry shocks (Krugman, 1993). As a result, the positive link between trade integration,
greater  synchronization,  and  stability  works  well  when  there  are  positive  spillovers
effects  from high-income partner  countries.  Prior  to  the  2008 economic  crisis,  trade
integration and synchronous effects can be seen as positive contributions to the financial
stability of developing partner countries because spillovers were largely positive. 
31 However, with emergence of the 2008 crisis in the United States, where spillover effects
to partner countries have been negative, then trade integration and synchronization may
not help produce increased stability and instead undermine stability. An early study of
the effects of the 2008 crisis on NAFTA members found that economic integration has
occurred under NAFTA but it has also made members more vulnerable to shocks, and if a
crisis occurs in the United States, its spread is immediate to its NAFTA partners (Correa,
Seccareccia,  2009).  In addition,  this study examined the Canadian banking sector and
found that Canada had a strong national banking system, which can explain why Canada
was more resilient in the face of the 2008 crisis than was the Mexican banking sector,
which faced bankruptcy and nationalization (Ibid.). So in different contexts, the benefits
of trade integration and business cycle synchronization may not outweigh the costs in
terms of macroeconomic volatility and stability, even though the common perception
views trade integration and business cycle synchronization as a positive contribution. 
 
2.1 Stability and Volatility after NAFTA
32 Macroeconomic volatility,  measured as  the standard deviation of  annual  GDP growth
rates, has decreased in Mexico since the implementation of NAFTA but it is still higher in
Mexico  than  it  is  for  the  United  States  and  Canada  (Kose,  Rebucci,  op.  cit.:  88).
Macroeconomic volatility increased from the 1970s to the early 1980s with the debt crisis,
and declined until 1994-1996 with the Tequila crisis (Lederman, Maloney, Servén op. cit.).
Since 1996, GDP growth volatility has decreased but remains higher than levels in the
1970s (Ibid.).  This  reduction in GDP growth volatility  could be a  result  of  increasing
vertical  IIT  from  NAFTA  but  also  better  domestic  macroeconomic  policies,  greater
international financial access and common regional shocks (Kose, Meredith, Towe, op. cit:
17-18). 
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33 While  there  is  a  reduction  in  macroeconomic  volatility  after  NAFTA,  Swinston  and
Bayoumi find significant spillover effects from the US to Canada and Mexico (Swiston,
Bayoumi, 2008). Specifically, they find that a 1 percent shock to US real GDP results in a
shift of .75 percent in GDP in the same direction for Canada since 1989 and a 1.5 percent
shift in the same direction for Mexico since 1996 (Ibid.). This means that GDP volatility
while decreasing over the NAFTA period can still  rise from negative spillover effects.
However, states can decouple from the US economy with a flexible macroeconomic policy
but this kind of flexibility will likely be easier for high-income states like Canada rather
than a developing state like Mexico (International Monetary Fund op. cit.). 
 
2.2 Stability and Volatility after CAFTA-DR
34 Overall,  macroeconomic  volatility  has  decreased since  1980-2003 for  the  members  of
CAFTA-DR (Kose,  Rebucci  op.  cit:  88-89).  This  indicates  that  outside  factors,  beyond
formal trade integration have played a great role in decreasing macroeconomic volatility,
since CAFTA-DR went into effect after 2003 for member states. But looking to the NAFTA
experience,  GDP growth volatility  may  further  decline  for  the  developing  CAFTA-DR
states post-CAFTA as it did for Mexico after NAFTA, especially since consumption and
investment volatility in CAFTA-DR countries were on the whole greater than Mexico in
the same period (Ibid.: 89). Additionally, CAFTA could further lower economic volatility
by contributing to  the  increased diversification of  exports  through access  to  the  US
market (Ibid.). However, more data will help clarify the role of CAFTA-DR in influencing
macroeconomic volatility or stability. 
35 Although macroeconomic volatility has diminished over time, a study on spillover effects
from the US to CAFTA-DR states has found that a 1 percent shock to U.S. growth shifts
economic activity by 0.7 to 1 percent in CAFTA-DR states, depending on the individual
country (Swiston, Bayoumi op. cit.: 4). In comparison with the NAFTA states, these effects
are just as significant for CAFTA-DR countries, especially since CAFTA-DR economies are
much smaller than NAFTA states. In addition, shocks associated with the 2008 financial
crisis  were found to have lowered economic activity by about 4 to 5 percent for the
CAFTA-DR states (Ibid.). Looking at spillover effects on specific CAFTA-DR countries, Costa
Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras are more sensitive to external shocks so the responses to
a  US  supply  shock  are  generally  deeper  and more  persistent  for  these  states  (Kose,
Rebucci, op. cit.: 92-93). The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Nicaragua are more
sensitive to domestic shocks so spillover effects in general have a smaller role (Ibid.).
Therefore, CAFTA-DR, by increasing trade and financial integration may also contribute
to significant spillover effects. As a result, the stabilizing effects of trade integration may
be mitigated by negative spillover effects from the US, when the US’s growth slows. 
 
3. Macroeconomic Synchronization and Policy
Coordination 
36 The importance of financial spillovers, especially during the 2008 crisis, underscores the
role  policy  coordination  could  play  in  stabilizing  developing  economies.  But
macroeconomic synchronization is important in determining the need for and benefits
from  policy  coordination  between  countries.  Policy  coordination  with  high-income
partners may benefit developing country partners by reducing macroeconomic volatility
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and increase stability, when macroeconomic variability is due to common shocks and not
country-specific shocks. This is because developing countries would most likely benefit
from coordinating with the stabilization policies of high-income countries, which are also
facing similar shocks. So symmetrical financial and monetary policy adjustments may
produce better results than asymmetrical adjustments, which may not provide enough
stabilization. In contrast, idiosyncratic volatility driven by sector specific shocks would
require monetary and fiscal policy autonomy to address country specific issues rather
than policy coordination with another state. From Section 1 and 2, since we expect there
to  be  less  synchronization  between  developing-industrial  pairs  in  a  FTA  because  of
asymmetric production structures and greater idiosyncratic macroeconomic volatility of
a developing partner state, policy coordination is less appropriate for developing partner
members.  In high-income pairs,  policy coordination is more advantageous because of
greater business cycle synchronization and symmetric production structures. 
37 Additionally from economic policy theory, the number of policy instruments must be at
least as equal to the number of economic objectives if a state wants to achieve all those
economic objectives (Tinbergen 1965). If the number of policy instruments is less that the
number of target variables, then a state must sacrifice some of its economic objectives.
This means that a state must have enough policy options to deal with various desired
economic goals. However, as countries become more interdependent with increased trade
integration,  states  find it  increasingly  difficult  to  pursue independent  policy  options
because policy instruments like fixed exchange rates, tariff discrimination, and export
subsidies  are  prohibited  by  free  trade  agreements  (Cooper  1980).  So  increased trade
integration and macroeconomic synchronization within FTAs may shrink the available
options for states in dealing with economic shocks. 
38 Moreover, from the Mundell-Fleming model, a state’s policy options are further limited
because it must choose between maintaining only two of the three following conditions:
capital  mobility,  monetary  policy  autonomy,  and  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system.  For
example, a state can fix its exchange rate but only by maintaining capital controls, or a
state can have free capital movement and retain independent monetary policy but only
by allowing floating exchange rates,  or  a  state  can have free  capital  movement  and
stabilize their currency but then will be unable to adjust monetary policy to deal with
inflation problems or with a recession. With the end of the Bretton Woods system and the
Nixon shock, which resulted in floating exchanges rates for most states and increased
exchange rate volatility, and the ease in which capital controls can be avoided now, states
are left with even fewer policy instruments to choose from. However, with fewer choices
and increased policy  coordination with  a  high-income state,  a  developing  state  may
benefit from increased international economic confidence due to greater domestic policy
credibility as it would be now in a sense locked in with high-income partners. But policy
coordination and its requisite loss of monetary policy autonomy has its costs, which must
be  weighed  against  its  benefits.  These  costs  are  lower  when there  is  business  cycle
synchronization between states and when states can use alternative policy instruments,
like  wage  and  price  adjustments  and  labor  flexibility  to  compensate  for  the  loss  of
monetary policy autonomy. While this is likely the case for high-income states, this is not
likely  the  case  for  developing  countries.  As  a  result,  we  should  expect  little  policy
coordination between developing and high-income state members of a FTA and more
policy coordination between industrialized pairs within a FTA. 
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3.1 Policy Coordination after NAFTA
39 Policy coordination requires a set of formal and informal common policies.  However,
since NAFTA establishes a FTA and does not require the formal adoption of policy rules, I
measure policy coordination with correlation coefficients  between key monetary and
financial policy indicators from annual World Bank data (World Bank op. cit.). Monetary
indicators are money and quasi- money growth, the natural log of total reserves, and
inflation. Fiscal indicators are current account balance, foreign direct investment inflows,
and government consumption. Table 5 reports the Pearson’s r for all policy indicators.
There is increasing positive movement of correlations in the post-NAFTA period for all
member  states  but  only  measures  of  FDI,  inflation,  and  reserves  show  significant
correlations  between  the  US-Canada  pair.  Overall  for  most  indicators,  there  is  little
indication of policy coordination between NAFTA members. 
 
Table 5
Policy Indicator Correlation Coefficients 
Fiscal Variables
Current  account
balance (% of GDP)
Foreign  Direct
Investment,  Net  inflows
(%GDP)
Government final consumption
expenditure (annual % growth)
US-Mexico
1980-1993
-0.408 -0.304 -0.511
US-Mexico
1994-2007
0.238 -0.186 -0.139
US-Mexico
1980-2007
-0.224 -0.200 -0.337*
Canada-Mexico
1980-1993
0.140 -0.538* -0.160
Canada-Mexico
1994-2007
0.272 -0.148 -0.331
Canada-Mexico
1980-2007
0.192 -0.173 -0.224
US-Canada
1980-1993
-0.079 0.311 0.401
US-Canada
1994-2007
-0.401 0.523* -0.003
US-Canada
1980-2007
-0.201 0.494** 0.255
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Monetary
Variables 
Inflation,  GDP
deflator (annual %
)
Money and quasi money
growth (annual %)
Natural  Log  Total  reserves,
including gold (current US$)
US-Mexico
1980-1993
-0.311 -0.345 -0.199
US-Mexico
1994-2007
-0.039 0.160 0.055
US-Mexico
1980-2007
-0.267 -0.211 -0.105
Canada-Mexico
1980-1993
0.003 -0.024 -0.212
Canada-Mexico
1994-2007
0.404 0.397 0.167
Canada-Mexico
1980-2007
0.087 0.107 -0.050
US-Canada
1980-1993
0.736*** 0.356 0.594**
US-Canada
1994-2007
0.531* 0.164 0.167
US-Canada
1980-2007
0.623*** 0.143 0.470**
Significance levels: *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
40 The  lack  of  policy  coordination  is  not  surprising  because  idiosyncratic  shocks  are
important, especially for Mexico. The costs of losing monetary policy autonomy are high
when there are negative spillovers from the US. Common policies would not offer enough
stabilization for Mexico if there were an asymmetric shock from a financial crisis. This is
due to several  factors:  1)  counter  cyclical  policies  like wage and price flexibility  are
harder for Mexico to achieve; 2) fiscal policy adjustments will be needed in these kinds of
situations;  3)  Mexico  has  weaker  links  to  international  finance  sources  and  weaker
domestic credit markets than the US and Canada (Lederman, Maloney, Servén, op. cit:
105-110). Additionally, while the US may follow similar policies facing external shocks,
the  intensity  of  policies  would  not  be  the  same  for  Mexico  or  Canada,  given  the
magnitude of spillover effects. Therefore, policy autonomy is still necessary even with
increased trade integration among NAFTA members since states  now also face fewer
available policy options. Indeed, Correa and Seccareccia’s research on the 2008 crisis and
NAFTA found that financial and trade openness, NAFTA commitments, and a balanced
budget law constrained the ability of the Mexican government to address the economic
crisis with an appropriate countercyclical program (Correa, Seccareccia op. cit.: 95).
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3.2 Policy Coordination after CAFTA-DR
41 Similar to the NAFTA section, I measure policy coordination with correlation coefficients
between key monetary and financial policy indicators between two member countries
from annual WB data (World Bank op. cit.).  I  chose El  Salvador and Guatemala again
because they are early members of CAFTA-DR and they also had the most data available
for the 2002-2009 period. Monetary indicators are money and quasi- money growth, the
natural log of total reserves, and inflation. Fiscal indicators are current account balance,
foreign  direct  investment  inflows,  and  government  consumption.  Table  6  shows  the
Pearson’s r for all the indicators. Again in general, for most indicators, we see very little
policy coordination between CAFTA-DR members.  For the period from 2006-2009,  the
correlations may be misleading because there are only observations for 4 years and they
encompass the period of the financial crisis. 
 
Table 6
Policy Indicator Correlation Coefficients
Fiscal Variables
Current  account
balance  (%  of
GDP)
Foreign  Direct
Investment, Net inflows
(%GDP)
Government  final
consumption  expenditure
(annual % growth)
US-El  Salvador
2002-2005
-0.972* 0.093 -0.679
US-El  Salvador
2006-2009
0.756 -0.023 0.713
US-El  Salvador
2002-2009
0.551 -0.011 0.206
US-Guatemala
2002-2005
-0.669 0.745 -0.371
US-Guatemala
2006-2009
0.881 0.580 0.159
US-Guatemala
2002-2009
0.708 0.502 -0.011
El  Salvador-
Guatemala
2002-2005
-0.912* -0.176 0.421
El  Salvador-
Guatemala
2006-2009
0.915** 0.763 0.316
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El  Salvador-
Guatemala
2002-2009
0.745* 0.083** 0.266
Monetary
Variables
Inflation,  GDP
deflator  (annual
%)
Money  and  quasi
money  growth  (annual
%)
Natural  Log  Total  reserves,
including gold (current US$)
US-El  Salvador
2002-2005
0.879 0.874 0.319
US-El  Salvador
2006-2009
0.394 0.313 0.373
US-El  Salvador
2002-2009
0.591 0.385 0.493
US-Guatemala
2002-2005
-0.929* 0.084 -0.155
US-Guatemala
2006-2009
0.460 -0.414 0.587
US-Guatemala
2002-2009
0.026 0.003 -0.148
El  Salvador-
Guatemala
2002-2005
-0.982** 0.539 0.697
El  Salvador-
Guatemala
2006-2009
0.948* 0.200 0.352
El  Salvador-
Guatemala
2002-2009
0.284 0.414 0.350
Significance levels: *=p<0.1, **=p<0.05, ***=p<0.01
42 Once more we see a general lack of policy coordination between the US and developing
CAFTA-DR members surveyed here. However, the CAFTA-DR members do have high levels
of trade with the US and have strong ties to the US dollar, which indicates that there may
be some benefits to policy coordination. For example, El Salvador presents an interesting
case  because  since  2001  it  has  dollarized  and  uses  the  US  dollar  as  its  currency.
Dollarization tends to reduce policy autonomy for states and signifies that a state cannot
undertake  its  own monetary  policy.  Nonetheless,  the  correlation  coefficients  for  the
monetary policy variables were increasing but not significant for the US- El Salvador pair.
In addition, CAFTA-DR states that are sensitive to domestic shocks also face the same
problems as Mexico. So those CAFTA-DR members will generally need to keep high policy
autonomy to address country-specific conditions. 
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 4. Conclusion
43 This  article  has  sought  to  answer  two  key  questions:  (1)  to  what  degree  is  there
macroeconomic synchronization and policy coordination between member countries of
NAFTA  and  CAFTA-DR?  and  (2)  what  are  the  effects  of  increasing  macroeconomic
synchronization  on  the  macroeconomic  policy  for  NAFTA  and  CAFTA-DR  partner
countries? While full economic convergence is not occurring after NAFTA, there is some
macroeconomic synchronization in the post-NAFTA period, which has consequences for
the appropriateness of policy coordination. There is also some preliminary evidence that
CAFTA-DR  economies  also  show some  convergence.  Looking  at  the  role  of  trade
integration on volatility, overall macroeconomic volatility has decreased for NAFTA and
CAFTA-DR members after implementation. However, the US as a key partner produces
both  negative  and  positive  spillover  effect  to  other  member  states.  This  means
synchronization can be costly for developing NAFTA and CAFTA-DR states, and domestic
policy remedies are still required. Finally, I find that there is little policy coordination
under NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, which can be understood by the logic that the loss of policy
autonomy  still  outweighs  the  benefits  of  coordination  for  most  developing  state
members. However, given the amount of time that has passed since the implementation
of  NAFTA and even more briefly for CAFTA-DR,  my findings must  be examined with
future data about patterns of trade and changes in policy. 
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NOTES
1. This relationship follows from optimum currency area theory. See Mundell 1961: 657-665 and
Mckinnon 1963: 717-724.
2. See Artis, Zhang 1995; Angeloni, Dedola 1999; Belo 2001; Boone 1997; Ramos, Clarr, Suriñat
2003: 241-245.
3. Generally,  asymmetrical  production  structures  between  countries  indicate  higher
specialization and more inter-industry trade. Similar production structures between countries
indicate less specialization and more intra-industry trade.
4. I  use the World Bank (WB) classification scheme. The WB classifies countries according to
gross national income per capita, into the categories of low income, lower middle income, upper
middle income, and high income. The term developing countries corresponds to the low income
plus the middle income categories. See World Bank, 2011, “How we Classify Countries”, <http://
data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications>. Accessed June 3, 2011.
5. There was a supplemental agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
that called for the enforcement of domestic labor laws.
6. In addition, prior to NAFTA, the US-Canada Fress Trade Agreement had been in force since
1989 and so US-Canada industries were already integrated before 1994.
7. Of  the  different  measures  of  correlation,  here  I  specifically  calculate  Pearson's  product
moment correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r), which are defined as the covariance of the two
variables divided by the product of their standard deviations, giving a value between +1 and −1
with values near 0 indicating little to no correlation and values near +1 and -1 signifying strong
correlation. This covariance quantifies how one variable changes as the other variable changes
and so it also illustrates the strength of the association between the two variables. I also use
Pearson’s r since it is a symmetric measure meaning that it does not distinguish between an
independent and a dependent variable.  Lagged effects  models,  which are commonly utilized,
would be more approporiate when dependent and independent variables are required. Moreover,
Pearson’s r only detects the linear dependence between two variables, which suits the data used
in this study. The linearity of data used in this study was checked graphically through bivariate
scatter plots. Thus, Pearson’s r can be used to look at how closely states’ outputs vary with each
other, indicating synchronization between them.
8. This can also be attributed to the strength of the US economy and relative wages in Mexico in
addition to NAFTA. See M. Angeles Villarreal, “Industry Trade Effects Related to NAFTA”, op. cit.
9. Date in parentheses indicates the date the agreement went into effect for the country.
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10. Nicaragua had too much missing data to include in this  analysis  even though Nicaragua
joined in 2006 as well.
11. I again used three measures of output: the natural log of exports of goods and services, the
natural log of value added industrial output, and GDP growth. Furthermore to detrend the data,
it  was  first  differenced.  I  separated the results  into  equal  time periods  before  and after  the
implementation of CAFTA, in this case 4 years and for the entire period between 2002-2009.
12. External  shocks  like  terms  of  trade  shocks  are  especially  important  if  external  trade  is
concentrated in commodities.
RÉSUMÉS
Malgré  d’importantes  et  nombreuses  disparités,  au  sein  de  l’Accord  de  libre-échange  nord-
américain (ALENA),  entre les  pays à  hauts  revenus et  les  pays en voie de développement,  la
synchronisation des cycles d’affaires a succédé à une intégration commerciale accrue depuis la
création de l’ALENA. Les économies de certains Etats membres de l’Accord de libre-échange entre
l’Amérique  centrale,  les  Etats-Unis  et  la  République  Dominicaine  (l’ALEAC-RD)  donnent
également des signes attestant une convergence de leurs cycles d’affaires, bien qu’il soit encore
trop tôt  pour  en tirer  des  conclusions  significatives,  étant  donné le  peu de  recul  dont  nous
disposons. La synchronisation macroéconomique revêt une importance particulière pour décider
des  politiques  à  adopter,  car  elle  révèle  les  besoins  et  avantages  de  la  coordination  de  ces
politiques. Cette coordination avec les pays membres à hauts revenus pourrait s’avérer profitable
aux pays membres en voie de développement, en réduisant la volatilité macroéconomique et en
accroissant la stabilité, puisque la variabilité macroéconomique résulte de chocs communs et non
de  chocs  spécifiques  à  un  pays.  La  volatilité  idiosyncrasique  nécessiterait  l’autonomie  des
politiques  monétaires  et  fiscales  plutôt  que  leur  coordination.  Alors  même  que  l’intégration
commerciale  réduit  les  options  des  Etats  membres  en  matière  de  politiques  à  adopter,  les
inconvénients d’une perte d’autonomie en ce domaine pèseraient bien davantage, pour les pays
en  voie  de  développement  membres  de  l’ALENA  et  de  l’ALEAC-RD,  que  les  bénéfices  d’une
coordination, étant donnée la variabilité macroéconomique et idiosyncrasique de ces pays.
In spite of many significant differences between high-income and developing country partners in
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), business cycle synchronization has followed
increased trade integration in the post-NAFTA period. There is also some preliminary support for
some  convergence  between  Dominican  Republic-Central  American  Free  Trade  Agreement
(CAFTA-DR)  economies  post-CAFTA-DR,  although  it  is  too  soon  to  reach  any  significant
conclusions.  Macroeconomic  synchronization  has  important  implications  for  policy  making
because it indicates the need for and benefits from policy coordination. Policy coordination with
high-income  partners  may  benefit  developing  country  partners  by  reducing  macroeconomic
volatility and increase stability, when macroeconomic variability is due to common shocks and
not country-specific  shocks.  Idiosyncratic  volatility  would require monetary and fiscal  policy
autonomy rather than coordination. Examining policy coordination between NAFTA states and
between  CAFTA-DR  members,  I  find  little  evidence  for  policy  coordination  before  and  after
implementation of the FTA. For the developing partners in NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, even as trade
integration shrinks the available policy options for member states,  the costs of  losing policy
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autonomy  largely  outweigh  the  benefits  of  coordination  because  of  the  idiosyncratic
macroeconomic variability of the developing partners.
A pesar de las numerosas diferencias significativas que existen entre los países de renta alta y los
países en desarrollo miembros del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN), la
sincronización de  los  ciclos  económicos  ha  seguido a  una integración comercial  en aumento
desde la entrada en vigor del TLCAN. Asimismo, existen pruebas de que algunas economías del
CAFTA-DR (Tratado de Libre Comercio  entre República  Dominicana,  Centroamérica  y  Estados
Unidos)  muestran  también  una  cierta  convergencia  de  los ciclos  económicos  pese  a  que  es
demasiado pronto para llegar a conclusiones relevantes en un periodo tan corto de tiempo. La
sincronización macroeconómica es importante para la toma de decisiones, dado que expresa la
necesidad de coordinar políticas y muestra las ventajas de dicha coordinación. La coordinación
de políticas con los socios con rentas elevadas puede beneficiar a los países en desarrollo gracias
a  la  reducción  de  la  volatilidad  macroeconómica  y  al  aumento  de  la  estabilidad  cuando  la
variabilidad macroeconómica se debe a perturbaciones comunes y no a desajustes específicos de
un país. La volatilidad idiosincrática requeriría la autonomía de la política monetaria y fiscal más
que una coordinación. Para los países socios en desarrollo del TLCAN y el CAFTA-DR, pese a que la
que integración comercial reduce las distintas posibilidades de actuación política de los Estados
miembros, el coste que representa la pérdida de autonomía supera con creces los beneficios de la
coordinación a causa de la variabilidad macroeconómica idiosincrática de los países socios en
desarrollo. 
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